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Rights of Public Employees and
Public Employee Unions Under




The basic rights of public employees and public employee un-
ions in Pennsylvania are stated in article IV of the Public Employe
Relations Act.' Article IV does not define these rights with specific-
ity; rather, like its counterpart in the National Labor Relations Act,'
it grants rights in broad terms:
It shall be lawful for public employees to organize, form, join
or assist in employee organizations or to engage in lawful con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid and protection or to bargain collectively through rep-
* B.A. 1971, Allegheny College; J.D. 1974, Dickinson School of Law; Member, Hand-
ler and Gerber, P.C., Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
I. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.401 (Purdon Supp. 1979). The Public Employee Rela-
tions Act (hereinafter referred to as "PERA"), id. at § 1101.101-1101.2301, is the primary
Pennsylvania law regulating the labor relations of public employers and their employees. Pub-
lic employers subject to PERA are
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, its political subdivisions including school dis-
tricts and any officer, board, commission, agency, authority or other instrumentality
thereof and any nonprofit organization or institution and any charitable, religious,
scientific, literary, recreational, health, educational or welfare institution receiving
grants or appropriations from local, State or Federal governments.
Id. at § 1101.301(l). The definition excludes employers covered by the Pennsylvania Labor
Relations Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 211.1 et seq. and the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 151 el seq. For an indication of nonprofit organizations held not to be public employ-
ers see Brownsville General Hospital v. PLRB, 15 Pa. Commw. Ct. 428, 325 A.2d 662 (1974);
Beth Jacobs Schools v. PLRB, 8 Pa. Commw. Ct. 343, 301 A.2d 715 (1973).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976) [hereinafter called the NLRA]. Section 7 of the NLRA, id. at
§ 157, corresponds to article IV of PERA. Section 7 provides as follows:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities or the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all
of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as au-
thorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
resentatives of their own free choice and such employees shall also
have the right to refrain from any or all such activities, except as
may be required pursuant to a maintenance of membership provi-
sion in a collective bargaining agreement.3
Precise definition of article IV rights is left to the adjudicating bodies
that pass on questions arising under PERA - the Pennsylvania La-
bor Relations Board and the Pennsylvania courts.
Article IV rights are enforceable directly through the mecha-
nism of the unfair labor practice created by section 1201 of PERA.'
In addition, the PLRB has recognized that some unfair labor prac-
tices committed in connection with a representation election under
the Act affect the validity of the election. 6 The board will enforce
article IV indirectly by setting aside an election because of certain
abridgements of article IV rights if objections to the election are filed
according to the Board's rules.' Like section 8 of the NLRA,8 PERA
section 1201 consists of two lists of possible offenses, employer of-
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101,401 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
4. As under federal law, violations of PERA are called unfair labor practices. Exclusive
jurisdiction to prevent unfair labor practices is vested under both laws in labor boards, the
administrative agencies created to deal with labor problems. Compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§ 1101.1301 with 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (although federal law does not specifically provide that the
National Board's jurisdiction is exclusive, as PERA does, the federal courts have so held, e.g.,
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Solien, 450 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 996
(1972)). Orders in unfair labor practice cases issued by the National Labor Relations Board
are subject to review in the United States Courts of Appeals, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) and (f). Those
issued by the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board are reviewable in the Commonwealth
Court, if the state is the employer, and in the appropriate court of common pleas when a
political subdivision or nonprofit corporation is the employer. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§ 1l01.1501-§ 1101.1505 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
5. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1201 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
6. PERA requires the Board to "establish rules and regulations concerning the conduct
of any election including but not limited to regulations which would guarantee the secrecy of
the ballot." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.606(2) (Purdon Supp. 1979). Section 1201 makes
violation of those rules and regulations by public employer or union an unfair labor practice.
Id. at § 1201(a)(7) and § 1201(b)(4). This Article is concerned not with violations of the for-
mal election conduct regulations, but with violations of article IV rights to support or oppose
unionization or other concerted activities. In this latter category are included such rights rec-
ognized by case law as the right to be free from unlawful threats, surveillance, and discharge,
and excessive restrictions on solicitation of other employees. See note 15 infra.
When the Board finds that an unfair labor practice has affected the outcome of an elec-
tion, it may set aside the election result and order a new election as well as award ancillary
relief in the form of, for example, a cease and desist order or reinstatement of an improperly
discharged employee to his job. E.g., Upper Darby Twp., 4 P.P.E.R. 105 (PLRB 1974); Un-
ionville-Chadds Ford School Dist., 3 P.P.E.R. 178 (PLRB 1973); Conemaugh Valley Memorial
Hosp., 2 P.P.E.R. 115 (PLRB 1972). Unlike the NLRB, the PLRB has held that it lacks au-
thority to issue a bargaining order in lieu of an election, when the lasting coercive effects of
employer unfair practices will prevent employees from freely exercising their franchise for a
period of time. Compare Somerset County Comm'rs, 2 P.P.E.R. 60 (PLRB 1972) with NLRB
v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
7. By filing objections to the outcome of an election, an employer or union may ask that
the election be set aside because certain conduct prevented employee exercise of free choice, a
right granted by article IV and the goal of § 605, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.605 (Purdon
Supp. 1979). Because a violation of article IV rights, an unfair labor practice under either
section 1201(a)(1) or (b)(1), often is a basis for objection to an election result, unfair labor
practice charges are commonly filed at the same time objections to elections are filed under the
Board's rules. PA. CODE § 95.57 (1979).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976).
fenses and union offenses.' First in each list is the unfair labor prac-
tice of violation of article IV rights.'° Because article IV is so broad,
the rights it protects encompass the other unfair labor practices listed
in section 1201. For example, an employer's dismissal of an em-
ployee for union activities abridges the employee's article IV rights
and violates section 1201(a) (3) as well as section 1201(a)(1). As a
result, two categories of article IV rights protected by section
1201(a)(1) and its counterpart applicable to unions, section
1201(b)(1), exist: independent rights, those rights that are protected
only by section 1201(a)(1) and (b)(1), and derivative rights, those
rights that are protected by other subsections of section 1201.11
Among the former are an employee's rights to solicit support for a
union' 2 and to resign his union membership. 3 In the latter category
is an employee's right to be free from discriminatory treatment be-
cause of union activities.' 4
This Article reviews the court and labor board decisions defin-
ing the independent article IV rights issued in the nine years that
PERA has existed, describes the status of the law, and suggests likely
future development. The rights discussed below are those that have
been the subject of PLRB or court decisions; ' 5 many more rights will
9. Both § 1201 of PERA and § 8 of the NLRA are subdivided into subsections (a) and
(b). Subsection (a) lists offenses that may be committed by employers, and subsection (b) lists
offenses commitable by labor organizations.
10. Section 1201 of PERA provides in subsection (a) and (b) as follows:
(a) Public employers, their agents or representatives are prohibited from:
(1) Interfering, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of of the
rights guaranteed in Article IV of this act.
(b) Employee organizations, their agents, or representatives or public employ-
ees are prohibited from:
(1) Restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed in Article IV of this act.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1201 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
The corresponding subsections of § 8 of the NLRA provide
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title;
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(1) to restrain or coerce (a) employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed in section 157 of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976).
11. Cf. The Developing Labor Law 66 (C. Morris, ed. 1971).
12. Conemaugh Valley Mem. Hosp., 2 P.P.E.R. 115 (PLRB 1972), cf. Clearfield Hosp., 5
P.P.E.R. 31 (PLRB 1974).
13. Association of Pa. State College and Univ. Faculties, 9 P.P.E.R. 72 (1978).
14. Clearfield Hosp., 5 P.P.E.R. 31 (PLRB 1974).
15. The important right of an employee to be fairly represented by his collective bargain-
ing representative, however, is not discussed here. For a discussion of the duty of fair repre-
sentation under PERA, see Decker, Fair Representation and Pennsylvania Public Employee
Labor Relations 83 DICK. L. REv. 709 (1979).
Likewise, this article does not consider the employee's right to engage in an organizing
campaign and vote in a PERA election without intimidation, even though this right necessarily
subsumes rights to be free from threats, discriminatory discharge or discipline, excessive re-
strictions on solicitation, the improper granting of advantages, coercive literature, unlawful
be recognized in the future, as they have been under the NLRA.' 6
Too often article IV is viewed only as the protector of the rights
of the individual employee against the stronger employers and un-
ions that would coerce him-as a sort of public employee's Four-
teenth Amendment,17 or as akin to the Employee Bill of Rights of
the Landrum-Griffin Act."8 Certainly, article IV protects individual
employees, but it also protects the rights of groups of employees who
engage in concerted activities through labor unions against the as-
saults of individual employees whose demands for the right to be
free from regulation would undermine the strength of unions and
their ability to perform the functions assigned to them by PERA.
II. The Scope of Article IV
PERA was modeled on the federal law, the Wagner Act as
amended by the Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin Acts,' 9 which
surveillance, and other employer or union activities that would prevent his free exercise of his
franchise.
With regard to § 1201(a)(1) and the interference with the exercise of article IV rights, and
§ 1201(a)(2) and the interference in the formation, existence and administration of an em-
ployee organization, the PLRB has stated,
"Various types of Employer conduct fall within these sections on unfair labor
practices, such as anti-union propaganda, surveillance of union activities, threats, at-
tacks on union organizers or employees, awarding or withholding direct economic
benefits, improper favoritism, interference with elections, interference with solicita-
tions of union membership, etc. The type of conduct prohibited is that tending to
interfere with the self-organization of the employees."
Somerset County Comm'rs, 2 P.P.E.R. 60, 64 (PLRB 1972); see also, Conemaugh Valley Mem.
Hosp., 2 P.P.E.R. 115 (PLRB 1972). Yet to discuss these rights pertaining to elections in the
context of article IV would present an incomplete analysis. Election campaigns and elections
concern not only article IV rights and §§ 1201(a)(l) and 1201(b)(l), but the PLRB's regula-
tions concerning the conduct of elections and possible violations of § 1201(a)(2) (employer
domination of a union), § 1201(a)(3) (employer discrimination to encourage or discourage
union activity) and, §§ 1201(a)(7) or 1201(b)(4) (violation of PLRB rules and regulations re-
garding elections), and grounds for objecting to elections under PLRB rules. For example, the
PLRB follows the NLRB's "laboratory conditions" rule under which the Board "seeks to pro-
vide a laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted, under conditions as nearly ideal
as possible to determine the uninhibited desires of the employees. Where for any reason the
standard falls too low the Board will set aside the election and direct a new one." Whitemarsh
Twp., 2 P.P.E.R. 49, 50 (PLRB 1972).
16. For a discussion of the development of federal law, see generaly, THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW, Chap. 5 (C. Morris, ed. 1971), as supplemented (1976) and (1978).
17. U.S. CONST., Amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution provides, in part, that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." (emphasis added).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 401 (1976). This statutory provision grants certain rights to individual
employees that may be exercised within or against their union.
19. The original national labor legislation is the Wagner Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), also
called the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Major amendments were made to the Wag-
ner Act, and new regulatory provisions were added to federal law, by the Taft-Hartley Act, 61
Stat. 162 (1947). Amendments were made to the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts, and new
statutory provisions regulating employee rights and internal union affairs were added to the
body of law, by the Landrum-Griffin Act, 73 Stat. 519 (1959), also called the Labor-Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA). Chapter 7 of title 29, U.S.C., 29 U.S.C.
§§ 141-188, which mainly consists of the Wagner Act as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, is
officially called the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA). That portion of the
generally is designated the Labor Management Relations Act,
1947.20 Consequently, the PLRB and the state courts have from the
beginning looked to federal precedent for guidance in deciding is-
sues under PERA.21  The recent decision of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in PLRB v. Altoona Area School District,2 2 which
reversed a Commonwealth Court decision rejecting federal prece-
dent, indicates that the policy of reliance on federal precedent is
stronger than ever. One must always remember, however, that no
PERA parallels exist to much of the Labor Management Reporting
and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act,23 the major portion of fed-
eral law protecting rights of employees in their dealings with their
unions. The PLRB said that it "has no authority to redress violation
of the LMRDA, '24 and noted that the General Assembly was aware
of the LMRDA when it passed PERA, but chose not to add similar
provisions to state law.25 Thus, although federal precedents should
be looked to for guidance in determining the rights of public em-
ployees and public employee unions, they are relevant only if based
LMRA that consists of the Wagner Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168, is officially called the National
Labor Relations Act. Hereafter, references to the NLRA, LMRA, or LMRDA refer to the
statutes in their present amended and codified forms.
20. The reliance of the drafters of PERA on the federal model are obvious. Compare,
e.g., the unfair labor practice provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970) with PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§ 1101.1201 (Purdon Supp. 1979); the wording of many of the clauses is identical. See also
notes 2-3 and accompanying text supra for a comparison of § 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1976) to article IV of PERA, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1201.401 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
21. The PLRB and Pennsylvania courts have relied on federal precedent under the
LMRA since the first adjudications under PERA. E.g., Beaver County Educ. Ass'n, I P.P.E.R.
68 (PLRB 1971) ("Section 1201(b)(7) of the Act is modeled after § 8(b)(4)(i)(ii)(b) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act"; NLRB precedent followed in determining construction of the
PERA provision); Magee Women's Hosp., I P.P.E.R. 88 (PLRB 1971) (federal precedent on
setting aside representation election because of pre-election conduct of union followed). Ex-
amples of court reliance on federal precedent include Wilkinsburg v. Sanitation Dep't, 463 Pa.
521, 525 n. 5, 345 A.2d 641, 643 n. 5 (1975), in which the state supreme court stated, "We have
held that practice under the NLRA may be looked to for guidance in interpreting similar
provisions of Pennsylvania labor legislation," and Hollinger v. Dep't of Public Welfare, 469
Pa. 358, 365 A.2d 1245 (1976); cf. Philadelphia Fed. of Teachers, Local 3 v. Board of Educ.,
458 Pa. 342, 327 A.2d 47 (1974) (court failed to follow federal precedent).
22. 480 Pa. 148, 389 A.2d 553 (1978).
23. 73 Stat. 519 (1959), as amended and codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976).
24. AFSCME, Local 2952H, 10 P.P.E.R. 107, 109 (PLRB 1979). The employee-com-
plainant charged the union with violating its duty to represent him because, inter alia, it re-
fused to provide him with a copy of the collective bargaining agreement. Under the LMRDA,
in many circumstances a union is obligated to provide a bargaining unit member with a copy
of the labor contract. 29 U.S.C. § 414 (1976).
25. When the PERA was passed, the General Assembly was aware of the 1959
amendments to the LMRA and could have similarly passed a "Bill of Rights" at the
state level. In the absence of such legislation the Board is not statutorily authorized
to require a union to make copies of the collective bargaining agreement available to
an employee. It is axiomatic that the Board, as a creature of statute, possesses only
those responsibilities and exercises only those powers that are conferred upon it by
statute. Since no similar legislation, as is set forth in LMRDA, is contained in PERA,
the Board cannot compel the Union to supply copies of contracts to non-members of
the Union.
AFSCME, Local 2952H, 10 P.P.E.R. 107, 109 (PLRB 1979).
on federal statutory provisions and policy analogous to those of
PERA.
The absence of LMRDA-like provisions in PERA leaves a wide
variety of matters subject to control by federal law unregulated in
Pennsylvania's public sector. Article IV, like section 7 of the
NLRA,26 protects employees from coercion and interference with
their rights to participate or not to participate in concerted activities.
Primarily, the LMRDA regulates an employee's rights within his
union and the actions of union officers. The LMRDA's "Employee
Bill of Rights" 27 grants to each union member equal rights and privi-
leges to nominate candidates, vote in union elections and referenda,
attend meetings, vote on union business, and express his views on
union business and candidates at meetings and elsewhere.28 It also
regulates the manner in which union dues and assessments are
raised, and forbids unions from imposing certain restrictions on a
member's right to sue his union, its officers or agents.29 Disciplinary
proceedings must conform with specified standards of due process of
law.3" The Employee Bill of Rights also requires unions to make
collective bargaining agreements available to members on request.31
Other provisions of the LMRDA impose extensive reporting require-
ments on unions and union officers, including the requirement to file
annual financial reports. 32 Trusteeship--the ability of a labor organ-
ization to assume control of a subordinate union, such as a local-is
regulated.33 Union members who have been convicted of certain
crimes or who fail to meet certain criteria are barred from holding
union office, 34 the manner of election of officers is regulated, 35 and
the posting of bonds is required.36 Causes of action and remedies for
violations of law are created,37 and authority to enforce some parts
of the statute is given to the Department of Labor.38
Enactment of the LMRDA followed the exposure of corrupt
union and managment practices by the McLellan Committee. 39 The
26. See notes 2-3 and accompanying text supra.
27. This name is frequently given to that portion of the LMRDA codified at 29 U.S.C.
411-415 (1976).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 41 1(a)(1) and (2) (1976).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 41 1(a)(3) and (4) (1976).
30. 29 U.S.C. § 41 1(a)(5) (1976).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 414 (1976).
32. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 431-441 (1976).
33. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 461-466 (1976).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 504 (1976).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 481 (1976).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 502 (1976).
37. 29 U.S.C. §§ 439-440; §§ 463-466; § 482; §§ 504-530 (1976).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 440; § 482; §§ 521-530 (1976).
39. In introducing S. 505, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1959), which eventually became the
LMRDA, Senator Kennedy stated the bill's general purpose as follows:
This is primarily a labor-management reform bill, dealing with the problems of
dishonest racketeering-it is not a bill on industrial relations, dealing with the
LMRDA was intended to "weed out instances of corruption, and
breach of trust; to preserve the rights of individual union members;
and to insure high standards of responsibility" and ethical conduct
by union officers in union affairs.4" The Congress aimed, therefore,
at ending an identified evil, and insuring, by the forced introduction
of democratic processes, that the evil would not recur.
The General Assembly's failure to include LMRDA-like provi-
sions in PERA indicates a legislative belief that such provisions are
unnecessary because the corrupt and undemocratic practices that
gave rise to the LMRDA do not exist among Pennsylvania's public
employee unions.4' Certainly one of the reasons that these problems
do not exist in Pennsylvania's public employee unions is that the
Pennsylvania unions are regulated indirectly by the LMRDA. The
federal labor laws extend to labor organizations representing em-
ployees who are employed by employers "in commerce. '4 2 Because
of the broad definition given the term "in commerce,"43 all but small
private employers with local operations are covered by the federal
law." Any union, local or international, that represents any employ-
problems of collective bargaining and economic power. The two areas of legislation
should not be confused or combined. The McLellan committee has been concerned
chiefly, as its title states, with "improper activities-with corruption, conflicts of inter-
est, unethical and undemocratic practices."
105 CONG. REC. 816 (1959). Seegenerally, 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGE-
MENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959 (1959).
40. McNamara v. Johnston, 360 F. Supp. 517, 522 (D. Ill. 1973), a 9'd, 522 F.2d 1157 (8th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976).
41. THE REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S STUDY COMM'N ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELA-
TIONS (1978), which was to make recommendations if changes were needed in public sector
collective bargaining laws, mentions no problems like those that prompted passage of the
LMRDA.
42. 29 U.S.C. § 142(3), §§ 152(2), (5), (6) and (7); §§ 402(a) (c) (e) and (i) (1976).
Essentially the same definitions are used in the LMRDA as are used in the LMRA and NLRA.
43. The United States Supreme Court has held that in the NLRA Congress intended the
fullest exercise of its constitutional power over interstate commerce. NLRB v. Reliance Fuel
Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224 (1963).
44. Although Congress intended the fullest exercise of its power over interstate com-
merce, the NLRB has chosen to set more stringent limits in the form of jurisdictional stan-
dards, dollar amounts for a business to meet, before the Board will exercise jurisdiction over a
complaint. It is possible, therefore, for small businesses to be "in commerce" and subject to
regulation by the LMRDA even though they fall below the Board's purchase or sale require-
ments. The NLRB jurisdictional standards do, however, provide an easily understood guide
as to which employers are covered by the federal law. Basic standards, per annum, are as
follows:
General nonretail: $50,000 total business, inflow and outflow
Retail: $500,000 gross volume
Combined retail and manufacturing: jurisdiction asserted if either retail or nonretail
standard met
Retail and wholesale: nonretail standard
Service: retail standard
Some other standards on a per-annum basis include the following:
Apartment projects: $500,000 gross revenue
Colleges: $1,000,000 revenues available for operating expenses
Radio and TV stations and telephone companies: $100,000 gross volume
Daycare centers: $250,000 gross revenues
Hospitals: $250,000 gross income for propriety
ees of employers "in commerce" must comply with the LMRDA,
45
and in fact, most unions do, and are subject to the LMRDA. Most
Pennsylvania public employee unions, moreover, are affiliated with
international unions subject to federal law and, therefore, function
under union constitutions and bylaws that were written to conform
to LMRDA standards. The other public employee unions not so af-
filiated often represent private sector employees as well, and are thus
required themselves to comply with federal law.
III. Rights Pertaining to Maintenance of Membership
and Dues Check-off Authorization
A. Maintenance of Membership
Among the most important of rights created by article IV are
rights regarding maintenance of union membership. 46 Because the
requirements of union membership enforceable under a mainte-
nance of membership clause are limited to "the payment of dues and
assessments while members, '47 and because an employee's initial de-
cision to subscribe to union membership is voluntary,48 the issues
surrounding maintenance of membership concern the ability to ter-
minate membership - the right of a member to resign, in opposition
to the rights of other union members to require his continued mem-
bership. PERA abolished the pre-existing right of employees to ne-
gotiate union security clauses stronger than maintenance of
Nursing homes: $100,000 gross income
Hotels: $500,000 gross business
Law firms: $250,000 gross revenues
Newspapers: $200,000 gross incomes
Public utilities: $250,000 gross volume or $50,000 inflow or outflow
Symphony orchestras: $1,000,000 revenues available for operating expenses.
LAB. REL. EXPEDITER (BNA) 376-80, as supplemented (May 19, 1979).
45. A union is deemed engaged in an industry affecting commerce and subject to the
LMRDA if it meets any of the following five criteria: (1) is the certified representative of
employees under the NLRA or the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976); (2) has
been recognized as bargaining agent of employees of an employer engaged in an industry
affecting commerce; (3) has chartered a subsidiary or local representing or actively seeking to
represent employees under (1) or (2); (4) has been chartered by a union representing or actively
seeking to represent employees under (I) or (2) through which the employees may enjoy mem-
bership or become affiliated with the organization; or (5) is a conference, joint council, or such
subordinate to a national or international labor organization engaged in an industry affecting
commerce under (1), (2), (3), (4), except a state or local central body. 29 U.S.C. § 402 (j) (1976).
46. An employee's Article IV right to refrain from engaging in concerted activities is
limited by the phrase "except as may be required pursuant to a maintenance of membership
provision in a collective bargaining agreement." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.401 (Purdon
Supp. 1979).
47. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.705 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
48. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 3 P.P.E.R. 197 (PLRB 1973); cf. Philadelphia Fed. of
Teachers, Local 3 v. Board of Educ., 458 Pa. 342, 327 A.2d 47 (1974) (retroactive application of
collective bargaining agreement containing maintenance of membership and dues deduction
provisions could not nullify otherwise valid resignations of employees from the union which
occurred before agreement was signed).
membership.49
Like the NLRA,5 ° PERA treats union security as an exception
to the broad right of an employee to refrain from union activities.
Article IV of PERA grants a right to refrain from "any and all" such
activities "except as may be required pursuant to a maintenance of
membership provision in a collective bargaining agreement."' 5' The
content of a maintenance of membership provision is defined as fol-
lows:
"Maintenance of membership" means that all employees who
have joined an employee organization or who join the employee
organization in the future must remain members for the duration
of a collective bargaining agreement so providing with the proviso
that any such employee or employees may resign from such em- -
ployee organization during a period of fifteen days prior to the
expiration of any such agreement.
52
Considerable litigation has occurred concerning union security
under PERA.
1. Thepost PERA-status of union security clauses pro vidingfor
stronger union security than maintenance of membership, and the right
to renegotiate such provisions.-Among the first questions to arise
pertained to union security clauses that antedated PERA and pro-
vided for stronger union security than maintenance of member-
ship.53 The continued validity of those provisions during an extant
collective bargaining agreement was not disputed because section
904 of PERA54 expressly provided that "[a]ny provision of any col-
lective bargaining agreement in existence on January 1, 1970 which
is inconsistent with any provision of this act but not otherwise illegal
shall continue valid until the expiration of such contract."55 The
controversy concerned whether an inconsistent union security clause
49. The common law did not regulate union security clauses in collective bargaining
agreements. Thus, before the enactment of PERA, some unions negotiated agreements requir-
ing union shop and agency shop clauses. See Philadelphia Housing Auth., 3 P.P.E.R. 197
(PLRB 1973) (union shop clause); Teamsters, Local 8, 1 P.P.E.R. 137 (PLRB 1971), rev'dmub.
noma. PLRB v. Zelem, 459 Pa. 399, 329 A.2d 477 (1974). In his dissent to the Zelem holding,
Mr. Justice Nix noted, "The majority concedes the legality of an agency shop security agree-
ment in Pennsylvania prior to enactment of the PERA." 459 Pa. at 408, 329 A.2d at 481.
50. Section 7 of the NLRA, the model for Article IV, grants employees the right to re-
frain from concerted activities "except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as
authorized in section 158(a)(3) .. " Section 158(a)(3) [§ 8(a) of the NLRA] states that
nothing in this subchapter, or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude
an employee from making an agreement with a labor organization. . . to require as
a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day follow-
ing the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement, which-
ever is later . ...
51. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.401 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
52. Id. at § 1101.301(18).
53. Teamsters, Local 8, 1 P.P.E.R. 137 (PLRB 1971) rev'dsub non?. PLRB v. Zelem, 459
Pa. 399, 329 A.2d 477 (1974).
54. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.904 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
55. Id.
could be bargained on in a subsequent contract, for the remainder of
section 904 contains language that, arguably, would have permitted
continued bargaining on such stronger union security clauses in sub-
sequent contracts: "The parties to such agreements may continue
voluntarily to bargain on any such items after the expiration date of
any such agreement and for so long as these items remain in any
future agreement."56
In PLRB v. Zelem57 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court an-
nounced a peculiar accommodation between the right to bargain
over inconsistent union security clauses and the right of a minority
of employees to avoid the consequences of stronger union security.
The Zelem case involved employees at the Pennsylvania State Uni-
versity who had been covered by a collective bargaining agreement
with the Teamsters union since 1967. Their agreement contained an
agency shop clause applicable only to employees hired after the
commencement of the term of the contract. Zelem, who joined the
University staff in 1966 and did not become a union member, was
not required to pay an agency fee. The 1967 contract expired in
1970, and the new contract contained an agency shop clause that did
not excuse pre-1967 employees from the requirement to pay a service
fee. Zelem paid under protest to avoid discharge and filed unfair
labor practice charges with the PLRB. 8
The Supreme Court's four-to-three majority appears to hold
that the elimination of the exemption of pre-1967 employees from
the agency shop clause was an unfair labor practice. 9 The Court
stated that the section 904 right of a public employer and public em-
ployee union with a collective bargaining agreement antedating the
passage of PERA to continue to "bargain" on inconsistent contract
provisions means that they may continue the provisions as they ex-
isted before PERA.60 They may not broaden an inconsistent union
security clause by extending it to employees not covered before
PERA, even if those employees were in the bargaining unit at the
time.6' Thus, as the dissenters pointed out, the definition given "bar-
gain" as used in section 904 is very narrow; it is merely the right to
"again agree to" the same agency shop provision as before.62 No
give-and-take, the salient characteristic of labor contract bargaining,
56. Id.
57. 459 Pa. 399, 329 A.2d 447 (1974).
58. Id. at 402, 329 A.2d at 478.
59. The Court notes that the original agency shop clause in what it calls "Agreement I"
did not affect Zelem. "There was no 'item' directly involving appellee in Agreement I." Id. at
404, 329 A.2d at 479.
60. "[We believe that permitting the parties 'to bargain' meant that they could again
agree to the modified-agency-shop provision. It did not mean that they could enlarge the now
forbidden practice to include those not previously bound by it." Id. at 405, 329 A.2d at 480.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 408-09, 329 A.2d at 481-482 (Nix, J., dissenting).
is permissible.63
The Zelem decision gives rise to some obvious questions. May
an inconsistent union security clause be extended to employees who
enter the bargaining unit through the addition of new job classifica-
tions or the opening of a new office, as through the mechanism of
unit clarification or accretion? What sort of change in the words of
the union security provision will work its invalidation? Would the
addition of a comma or a requirement that an initiation fee
equivalent, in addition to a monthly dues equivalent, be paid suffice?
The Zelem opinion gives no answer and little guidance. On its face,
Zelem appears concerned with a change in the words of the inconsis-
tent clause itself, to the extent that it would broaden the clause to
include previously unincluded employees. If the coverage of the
clause is broadened through bargaining over the definition of the
bargaining unit,' or if the PLRB should redefine the bargaining
unit,65 the inconsistent union security clause would be undisturbed,
and perhaps meet with the Court's approval. Certainly the policy
behind PERA, to create orderly labor relations, would best be served
by allowing uniform union security in each properly defined bar-
gaining unit.
2. Resignation from union membershio-Each maintenance of
membership clause subject to PERA must permit an employee to
resign his union membership within the fifteen day period preceding
expiration of the collective bargaining agreement.66  Nothing in
PERA limits the term of a labor contract, or defines the manner in
63. The court majority expressly refused to give the word "bargain" as used in § 904 its
"common and approved usage," which is normally required by the Statutory Construction
Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1903 (Purdon Supp. 1979). Instead, the court adhered to the
following analysis, which appears to view the union and the employees as separate parties to
the bargaining process:
While it is true, as the board [the PLRB] argues in its brief, that "bargain," when
used as a verb, usually connotes "a give and take procedure," as to the provision in
question, there was no "give" on the part of either the union or the employer. The
obligation provided for was solely that of appellee and others of her status. They
were, admittedly, not part of the bargaining process. (Footnote omitted.)
459 Pa. at -, 329 A.2d at 479-480 (1974). In light of subsequent holdings that a union has a
statutory duty fairly to represent all bargaining unit employees in collective bargaining, see
Commonwealth of Pa. (Bur. of Labor Relations), 10 P.P.E.R. 10144 (PLRB 1979), the Zelem
Court's view is an incongruity.
64. Because PERA does not permit voluntary recognition of a union and definition of a
bargaining unit without PLRB approval, see Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 1101.602, § 1101.604 (Pur-
don Supp. 1979), it is unclear whether employer and union may alter the definition of the
bargaining unit through negotiation without also petitioning the Board for approval of the
change.
65. PLRB rules permit questions concerning the definition of a previously certified col-
lective bargaining agreement to be raised through the mechanism of a unit clarification peti-
tion, which may be filed by the public employer or union. 34 PA. CODE § 95.23 (1979).
Through a unit clarification proceeding a bargaining unit definition may be altered to reflect
changes in the employer's operations, such as elimination or addition of job classifications,
departments, and office locations.
66. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.301(18) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
which resignation shall be accomplished. Thus, several general
questions arise. First, when does the fifteen day resignation period
prior to expiration of a collective bargaining agreement occur? Sec-
ond, does a member have a right to resign when no contract is in
effect? Third, what technical requirements must be met in order to
resign?
(a) The occurrence of a resignation period before the expiration
of a collective bargaining agreement-The only reported decisions
addressing the question of occurrence of the fifteen day resignation
period concern the contract between the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania and the Association of Pennsylvania State College and Uni-
versity Faculties (APSCUF), the certified bargaining representative
of the teaching and administrative faculty of Pennsylvania's thirteen
state-owned colleges and its state-owned university.67 APSCUF and
the Commonwealth entered into a collective bargaining agreement
to be effective from September 1, 1974 through August 31, 1977, but
which contained provisions for pre-expiration renewal in accordance
with the pattern of labor contracts between the Commonwealth and
other collective bargaining agents.68 Under this latter provision the
term of the contract and several other provisions were renegotiated,
and a new agreement signed on March 17, 1976.69 The new expira-
tion date was June 30, 1979, but provision was made for later expira-
tion if the Commonwealth's contract "covering the largest number of
Commonwealth employees" should expire at a later date.7°
In 1977 another employee organization conducted a campaign
to weaken APSCUF by encouraging APSCUF members to resign
during the fifteen day period preceding the original expiration date
of August 31, 1977."' APSCUF took the position that no resignation
period occurred in August, 1977 because the old contract had been
superseded by the new contract, and therefore, no contract expired
on August 31, 1977. In APSCUF's view, a membership resignation
period had occurred during the fifteen days that preceded March 17,
1977, the date of termination of the old contract and signing of the
67. Association of Pennsylvania State College and Univ. Fac., 9 P.P.E.R. 542 (Nisi Deci-
sion, 1979), modifled, 10 P.P.E.R. 175 (PLRB 1979); Commonwealth of Pa., 10 P.P.E.R. 19
(1978).
68. Commonwealth of Pa., 10 P.P.E.R. 19, 20 (PLRB 1978).
69. Id.
70. Opinion and Award of Arbitrator Eli Rock in the Matter of the Arbitration Between
Association of Pennsylvania State College and University Faculties and Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, Department of Education, at 3-4 (Nov. 18, 1977) (hereinafter cited as "AP-
SCUF Arbitration Decision"). Though unpublished, the award is on the public record as an
exhibit in the PLRB cases cited at note 67 supra.
71. One of the charges filed against APSCUF was filed on behalf of this organization, the
College and University Faculty Association, an affiliate of the Pennsylvania State Education
Association and the National Education Association. Association of Pa. State College and
Univ. Fac., 9 P.P.E.R. 542, 543 (PLRB 1978).
new contract.72 The Commonwealth stated that it would recognize a
period in the last fifteen days of August, 1977, during which an em-
ployee could resign membership and revoke a dues check-off author-
ization.73 APSCUF and the Commonwealth took their dispute to
arbitration.74 A short time later two employees who claimed to have
submitted resignations during this fifteen day period filed unfair la-
bor practice charges against APSCUF and the Commonwealth to
require the recognition of their resignations.75 The PLRB stayed its
proceedings pending outcome of the arbitration.76
Three major issues were presented to the arbitrator: (1) whether
a membership resignation period occurred during the last fifteen
days of August, 1977; (2) whether a dues check-off revocation period
occurred during the last fifteen days of August, 1977; and (3)
whether a membership resignation, by itself, operates automatically
to revoke a dues check-off authorization. The arbitrator held that a
membership resignation and a dues check-off revocation period oc-
curred during the last fifteen days of August, 1977, and that a check-
off authorization continues after membership resignation unless spe-
cifically revoked. 77 He differentiated between maintenance of mem-
bership and dues check-off authorizations, in part, because the two
subjects are treated differently by PERA. His finding that a mem-
bership resignation period occurred in August, 1977 was based
mainly on the statute rather than the contract. 78  The arbitrator's
conclusion on this issue notes that "employees are in effect told by
statute that they will have the right to resign during the last fifteen
days of the collective bargaining agreement which sets forth the
maintenance of membership requirement. ' 79 Thus, the arbitrator
held that the March 17, 1976 agreement on the "term of agreement"
clause of the original contract "could not affect the basic statutory
right to resign from membership in the last fifteen days of the 1974
agreement containing the basic maintenance of membership require-
ment."
80
72. APSCUF Arb. Dec. at 6.
73. Id. at 7.
74. Id.; Association of Pa. State College and Univ. Fac., Inc., 9 P.P.E.R. 72 (1978)
(PLRB stays unfair labor practice case pending arbitration); 9 P.P.E.R. 542 (1978) (PLRB
refuses to defer to arbitrator's award, but reaches same result as arbitrator).
75. Commonwealth of Pa., 10 P.P.E.R. 19 (PLRB 1978).
76. After the charges were filed against APSCUF by a professor asserting that APSCUF
improperly attempted to have him rescind his resignation, APSCUF moved the PLRB to dis-
miss or stay the charges pending arbitration of the underlying dispute involving the validity of
the resignation and existence of a resignation period. The Board granted APSCUF's motion,
see Association of Pa. State College and Univ. Fac., Inc., 9 P.P.E.R. 72 (PLRB 1978), but later
refused to defer to the arbitrator's award, see Association of Pa. State College and Univ. Fac.,
Inc., 9 P.P.E.R. 72, modfied, 10 P.P.E.R. 175 (PLRB 1979).
77. APSCUF Arb. Dec. at 23.
78. See APSCUF Arb. Dec. at 5-12.
79. Id. at 12.
80. Id. (emphasis in original).
Although the PLRB stayed its handling of the unfair labor prac-
tice charges pending the APSCUF/Commonwealth arbitration, 8' the
Board did not defer to the arbitrator's award after it was issued.82
Nevertheless, it reached exactly the same conclusions on all three
issues. On the issue of the occurrence of the membership resignation
and check-off revocation period the PLRB relied on Printing Special-
ties Union 527 (Mead Corp.),83 a decision of the NLRB later en-
forced by the Fifth Circuit. The NLRB had passed on the issue of
whether the renewal of a contract before its original expiration date
had the effect of altering a check-off authorization revocation period,
and had concluded that it did not.84
The propriety of the PLRB's total reliance on this NLRB prece-
dent is questionable, for enormous differences exist in the subjects
being considered and the underlying state and federal laws. In its
ruling the PLRB admits that the National Board "reasoned that to
sanction the effectiveness of a premature contract renewal, establish-
ing the [check-off authorization] escape period, they would [sic] per-
mit the parties to eliminate the statutorily guaranteed escape
period."85 Application of the federal rule is suspect because PERA
contains no "statutorily guaranteed escape period" similar to federal
law.86 The NLRB was dealing with a dues check-off revocation pe-
riod, not a membership resignation period. Unlike PERA, federal
labor law provides that a check-off authorization must be revocable
each year or at the termination of the collective bargaining agree-
ment, whichever occurs first.87 Of course, federal law requires no
membership resignation period because union security clauses re-
81. Association of Pa. State College & Univ. Fac., Inc., 9 P.P.E.R. 72 (PLRB 1978).
82. Association of Pa. State College & Univ. Fac., Inc., 9 P.P.E.R. 542 (Nisi Decision
1978), modred, 10 P.P.E.R. 175 (PLRB 1979.
83. 215 N.L.R.B. No. 15, 87 L.R.R.M. 1744 (1974) enfd, 523 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 197-).
84. Employees had signed check-off authorization cards containing the usual LMRA lan-
guage allowing revocation in one year or within 15 days prior to the end of the applicable
collective bargaining agreement, whichever is sooner. The labor contract was to expire No-
vember 1, 1973, but a new agreement, signed October 13, 1973, replaced the expiring contract
on October 15, 1973, the sixteenth day before expiration.
85. Association of Pa. State College College and Univ. Fac., 9 P.P.E.R. 542, 545 (PLRB
1978).
86. The extent of PERA regulation of dues check-off consists of the statement that
"membership dues deduction" is a proper subject of bargaining, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§ 1101.705 (Purdon Supp. 1979), and the following definition of the term:
Membership dues deduction" means the practice of a public employer to deduct
from the wages of a public employee, with his written consent, an amount for the
payment of his membership dues in an employee organization, which deduction is
transmitted by the public employer to the employee organization.
Id. § 1101.301(11).
87. Federal law allows payments of checked-off dues by employers to unions only if
the employer has received from each employee, on whose account such deductions
are made, a written assignment which shall not be irrevocable for a period of more
than one year, or beyond the termination date of the applicable collective agreement,
whichever occurs sooner.
29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (1976).
quiring union membership are legal under it.88 Although PERA re-
quires a membership resignation period to occur during fifteen days
preceding the expriation of a labor contract, no limit is placed on the
term of the labor contract. Had APSCUF's 1974 agreement been for
a term of twenty years, therefore, the maintenance of membership
clause could have required continued union membership for the en-
tire term. In the absence of a legal requirement that a resignation
period occur within a fixed period of time, there is no justification for
the creation of a fifteen-day resignation period before August 31,
1977 because no collective bargaining agreement expired on August
31, 1977.
(b) Resignation when no collective bargaining agreement is in ef-
fect-When no collective bargaining agreement is in effect, there can
be no maintenance of membership provision binding on an em-
ployee to continue his membership, and he is free to resign.89 Fed-
eral law restricts this right in two ways, but Pennsylvania rejects both
restrictions.
Under federal law, an employee may not resign membership
even when no collective bargaining agreement is in effect if the
union constitution or by-laws bars resignation.9 ° Of course, while no
labor agreement is in effect the employee cannot be prevented from
resigning by loss of employment. But his continued membership
could be enforced in civil law like an ordinary membership con-
tract.9'
Federal law also permits the retroactive invalidation of a resig-
nation.92 No fifteen-day resignation period is required under a
maintenance of membership provision by federal law as it is under
Pennsylvania law. Thus, if one contract with a maintenance of
membership clause is immediately followed by another, no period
will occur during which an employee may resign.93 And even if a
hiatus does occur, and a proper membership resignation is submit-
88. Under federal law an employee outside of the building and construction industry
may be required to become and remain a member of a union after the thirtieth day of his
employment. Union membership may be required of a building and construction industry
employee after the seventh day of his employment. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) and (f) (1976).
89. The essence of a maintenance of a membership obligation is that an employer may
be required to continue membership only during the term of the collective bargaining agree-
ment containing the maintenance of membership clause, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, 1101.301(18)
(Purdon Supp. 1979); Philadelphia Fed. of Teachers, Local 3 v. Board of Educ., 458 Pa. 342,
327 A.2d 47 (1974); NLRB v. Textile Workers Union, 409 U.S. 213 (1972).
90. Machinists, Lodge 405 v. NLRB, 412 U.S. 84, 83 L.R.R.M. 2189 (1973); NLRB v.
Textile Workers Union, 409 U.S. 213 (1972); NLRB v. Auto Workers, 320 F.2d 12, 53
L.R.R.M. 2768 (1st Cir. 1963).
91. Williams v. Masters, Mates & Pilots, Local 2, 384 Pa. 413, 120 A.2d 896 (1956); Com-
monwealth ex rel. Burt v. Union League of Philadelphia, 135 Pa. 301, 19 A. 1030 (1890).
92. Cf. Machinists, Lodge 1129,219N.L.R.B. 1019,90 L.R.R.M. 1040 (1975), review dir-
missed, 539 F.2d 1093 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977).
93. Id.
ted, the resignation might retroactively be invalidated if the new
contract is made effective retroactive to expiration of the old.94
Pennsylvania rejected these federal precedents in Philadelphia
Federation of Teachers, Local 3 v. Board of Education.9" The state
supreme court considered the question of whether resignation during
a hiatus was valid where the successor contract was made retroactive
to expiration of the first. The court held the right of an employee to
resign when no contract is in effect is "no less inviolate than the right
to resign" during the fifteen-day period prior to expiration of the
previous contract.96
(c) The manner of effecting membership resignation-Although
PERA grants a right to resign membership, it says nothing of the
manner in which resignation is to be effected. Under federal law the
parties to a collective bargaining agreement are free to impose re-
quirements for membership resignation in their contracts, and un-
ions are free to set resignation procedures in their constitutions and
by-laws.9" Presumably, Pennsylvania's public employers and public
employee unions have the same rights.
In one APSCUF case98 the union challenged the validity of
membership resignations received by it after August 31, 1977, the
last day of the fifteen-day resignation period. There was no doubt
that the resignations had been signed before expiration of the period,
and that copies of the resignations had been submitted to the em-
ployer, the Commonwealth, within the period.9 9 The agents for the
raiding union testified that they attempted to deliver the resignations
to APSCUF on the afternoon of the last day and found the offices
closed, and had then taken the resignations to their union offices and
left them in the mail room to be mailed to APSCUF. No one testi-
fied that the resignations had been mailed that day. On the ground
that a reasonable attempt to deliver the resignations was made, the
PLRB found them to be valid. IOI In so ruling the Board did not state
whether the timely submission of a resignation only to the employer
is sufficient, or whether submission to both union and employer is
necessary. Moreover, the Board did not state whether delivery of the
resignation to the proper party within the fifteen-day resignation pe-
riod was necessary.
94. The federal precedents apply principles of contract law, see, e.g., id.; Autoworkers
Union, 142 NLRB No. 15, 53 L.R.R.M. 1009 (1963).
95. 458 Pa. 342, 347 A.2d 47 (1974).
96. Id. at 51.
97. NLRB v. Auto Workers, 320 F.2d 12, (Ist Cir. 1963). See also Rubber Workers,
Local 1621 (Atlantic Research Corp.) 167 N.L.R.B. 610, 66 L.R.R.M. 1109 (1967); butsee Auto
Workers, Local 1384 (Excell-O Corp.), 227 N.L.R.B. 1045, 94 L.R.R.M. 1145 (1977).
98. Commonwealth of Pa., 10 P.P.E.R. 19 (PLRB 1978).
99. Id. at 21.
100. Id. at 22.
Federal law indicates some answers that the PLRB could adopt
to these questions. If a union has resignation procedures written into
its constitution or by-laws, those procedures should be followed as to
the manner and time of resignation unless they are so restrictive that
they prevent an employee from exercising his statutory right to re-
sign. ' This rule could be applied both to the manner and the time
of submission of a resignation.
B. Dues cheek-off authorization
It is customary for collective bargaining agreements that contain
union security clauses also to contain provisions allowing for deduc-
tion of union dues from employee's paychecks, with written consent
of the employee, and the transfer of the withheld dues directly from
the employer to the union. In labor relations this process is called
dues "check-off." The legal relationship between union, employer,
and employee created by check-off is important. A collective bar-
gaining agreement between union and employer requires the em-
ployer to honor a duly executed check-off authorization from an
employee. The union is not actually a party to the check-off authori-
zation; rather, the authorization is an assignment by the employee of
part of his wages to the union. The contract is, therefore, between
employee and employer for the benefit of the union. '
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PERA says very little about check-off authorizations. "Mem-
bership dues deductions" are made a mandatory subject of bargain-
ing by section 703,03 and the term is defined in section 301 (11)
merely as
the practice of a public employer to deduct from the wages of a
public employee, with his written consent, an amount for the pay-
ment of his membership dues in an employee organization, which
deduction is transmitted by the public employer to the employee
organization.'04
This is quite different from federal labor law, which requires that a
check-off authorization be given voluntarily, 0 5 and that it be revoca-
ble at the termination of the labor contract or one year, whichever is
first.tIe The PLRB appears powerless, therefore, to prescribe a revo-
101. NLRB v. Auto Workers, Local 899, 320 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1963).
102. Washington Post Co., 66 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 553, 562 (1976) (Gamser Arb.), and
cases cited therein.
103. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 43, § 1101.703 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
104. Id. § 1101.301 (11).
105. E.g., Hampton Merchants Ass'n, 115 N.L.R.B. 1307 (1965); Safeway Stores, Inc., 111
N.L.R.B. 968 (1955); Sterling Precision Corp., 131 N.L.R.B. 1229 (1961).
106. Section 302(a) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 186(a), broadly prohibits payments by an
employer to a union. The allowance of dues check-off appears in the law as an exception to
this broad prohibition:
The provisions of this section shall not be applicable . . . (4) with respect to
money deducted from the wages of employees in payment of membership dues in a
labor organization: Provided, that the employer has received from each employee, on
cation period like that for membership resignation.
In one recent APSCUF case the PLRB recognized that mem-
bership resignation and dues check-off revocation are separate and
distinct acts, and that the performance of one does not perform the
other:
Both maintenance of membership and dues check-off deductions
must be treated separately. This is evident from the Act itself in
which maintenance of membership is defined at 301(18) and both
membership dues deductions and maintenance of membership are
treated as separate entities, proper subjects for bargaining, in sec-
tion 705. 107
The Board also relied on the fact that the APSCUF/Commonwealth
contract before it in that case treated the two matters separately. 08
In adopting this position the labor board is on firm ground, sup-
ported by federal law and the weight of labor arbitration decisions.
In Shen-Mar Food Products, Inc. "09 the NLRB held specifically that
an employer violated federal law by treating membership resigna-
tions from a union as check-off revocations. The NLRB concluded
that under the collective bargaining agreement "a revocation of the
dues check-off could be effected only in conformity with the provi-
sions of the [check-off] authorization form"" 0 and found the em-
ployer's failure to honor the check-off authorizations of employees
who resigned union membership to be a violation of the check-off
clause of the labor contract and, therefore, a violation of section
8(a)(5) of the NLRA."' On appeal, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit agreed with the Board's holding and
enforced its order." 1
2
Numerous arbitration decisions hold that check-off authoriza-
tions may survive membership resignation. In a recent arbitration
between the Washington Post Company and its Newspaper Guild
local,"I3 Arbitrator Howard G. Gamser surveyed arbitration prece-
dent and quoted the following passage from an unreported arbitra-
tor's decision: "The greater weight of arbitral authority holds that
the check-off of union dues continues despite resignation from the
union or unless the authorization is revoked in accordance with the
terms of the authorization itself."' 14
whose account such deductions are made, a written assignment which shall not be
irrevocable for a period of more than one year, or beyond the termination date of the
applicable collective agreement, whichever occurs sooner ....
29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (1976).
107. Commonwealth of Pa., 10 P.P.E.R. 19, 22 (PLRB 1978).
108. Id.
109. 221 N.L.R.B. No. 219, 91 L.R.R.M. 1122 (1976), enf'd, 557 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1977).
110. 557 F.2d at 399.
111. Id.
112. Sub nom. NLRB v. Shen-Mar Food Prod., Inc., 557 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1977).
113. Washington Post Co., 66 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 563 (1976) (Gamser, Arb.).
114. Id. at 565.
In the APSCUF case, the Pennsylvania Board tacitly rejected an
assertion that to permit check-off to continue following membership
resignation is to create an agency shop." 5 The complainant argued
that to require continued check-off after membership resignation is
to create an agency shop that, of course, is illegal under PERA."
16
The logic of the agency shop argument is difficult to discern, for by
definition an agency shop requires all employees in the bargaining
unit to join the union or to pay a service fee to the union as a condi-
tion of employment. 1 7 Certainly no such union security is created
by a rule that a voluntarily executed check-off authorization has a
separate existence apart from the membership contract.
Rejection of the agency shop argument also follows federal pre-
cedent and the weight of arbitral opinion. The Shen-Mar case arose
in Virginia, where that state's right-to-work law"I8 bars all union se-
curity clauses. The controversy decided in AlliedMaintenance Corp.,
an arbitration proceeding, arose in Texas, a state where union secur-
ity clauses also are banned by a right-to-work law. 119 In both cases it
was argued that continuation of dues check-off following member-
ship resignation violates the ban on agency shops, and in both cases
the argument was squarely rejected. The arbitrator in AlliedMainte-
nance Corp. held,
In compliance with the foregoing [contract] provision, cou-
pled with the Texas prohibition against an agency shop, the check-
off authorizations appear to constitute a wholly voluntary act and
absent evidence to the contrary, it is determined that these autho-
rizations were obtained in a noncompulsory fashion in accordance
with state law. As such, there is no 'agency shop' as the term is
commonly used, since no compulsory payment of fees and dues is
required. 120
In Shen-Mar the NLRB dismissed the agency shop argument thus:
Finally, Respondent's defense is predicated on its reliance on
state law to the effect that an employer cannot deduct dues after
an employee has terminated his membership in the union by res-
ignation. In this regard, we agree with the Administrative Law
Judge that the dues check-off herein does not, in and of itself, im-
pose union membership or support as a condition required for
continued employment . ...
The Fourth Circuit approved the NLRB's dismissal of this argu-
ment, stating,
115. Commonwealth of Pa., 10 P.P.E.R. 19, 22 (PLRB 1978). See also Brief for Com-
plainant submitted in that case.
116. Id., Brief for Complainant at 9-11.
117. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
118. VA. CODE §40.1-58 to §40.1-69 (1976).
119. 66 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 875 (1976) (Lichman, Arb.). The Texas Right-to-Work
Act appears as Art. 5307A of the Texas laws.
120. 66 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 875 (1976) (Richman, Arb.)
121. 221 N.L.R.B. 1329, 1330, 91 L.R.R.M. 1122, 1123 (1976) enfld, 557 F.2d 396 (4th Cir.
1977).
The Board rejected Shen-Mar's contention, holding that the
check-off provision was not a union security device which would
be subject to State Law under Section 14(b). While Shen-Mar has
not specifically pressed this point before us, we think it appropri-
ate to note that the Board's holding is well supported.
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If the membership resignation does not revoke a check-off au-
thorization, it becomes necessary to consider the question whether
check-off revocation periods are regulated by PERA. 23 Neither the
Act itself nor decisions under it are helpful in answering the ques-
tion. PERA does not define a check-off revocation and does not fix a
maximum term during which an authorization may be valid. The
PLRB has not ruled on the issue. In the APSCUF case such a ruling
was unnecessary because the collective bargaining agreement ex-
pressly provided that a check-off authorization was revocable at the
same time as membership revocation was permitted, and the arbitra-
tor who interpreted the contract found that membership resignation
and check-off revocation periods occurred concurrently in August,
1977.124 Federal precedent is of no help because the federal regula-
tion of check-off is totally different; the LMRA specifically provides
for check-off revocation periods to occur at least annually.
25
Although a check-off authorization is a separate contract, it nev-
ertheless draws its vitality from the collective bargaining agreement.
Unless required to do so by a labor contract, an employer is under
no duty to accept and honor a check-off authorization received from
an employee. 26 Thus, when an employee is transferred to a job
outside the bargaining unit, even temporarily, the employer's duty to
deduct dues lapses, although the employee may be obligated by his
membership contract with the union to continue to pay dues until he
resigns. 2" And when a labor contract expires, the employer's duty
to check-off dues may expire as well. 2 ' Mere expiration of the labor
contract, however, does not necessarily void a check-off authoriza-
tion, for it has been held that a pre-existing check-off authorization
remains valid under a new labor contract containing a check-off au-
thorization clause.
129
Despite the lack of statutory regulation of the term of a check-
122. Sub nom. NLRB v. Shen-Mar Prod. Corp., 557 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1977).
123. If membership resignation operates to revoke a check-off authorization, then it is
clear that check-off may be revoked when membership may be resigned, viz., during the 15
days preceding expiration of a labor contract and when no contract is in effect.
124. APSCUF Arbitration Award at 23.
125. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (1976). See also note 106 supra.
126. Commonwealth of Pa. (Pa. Liquor Control Bd.), 8 P.P.E.R. 326 (PLRB 1977); Eliza-
bethtown Area Bd. of School Directors, 5 P.P.E.R. 31 (PLRB 1974).
127. Commonwealth of Pa. (Pa. Liquor Control Bd.), 8 P.P.E.R. 326 (PLRB 1977).
128. See Elizabethtown Area Bd. of School Directors, 5 P.P.E.R. 31 (PLRB 1974); Com-
monwealth of Pa. (Pa. Liquor Control Bd.), 8 P.P.E.R. 826 (PLRB 1977).
129. Opinion on Check-off of' U.S. Dep't. of Justice (May 13, 1947), reported at 22
L.R.R.M. 46.
off authorization, there is no reason to believe that the matter is en-
tirely left to the union and employer. It may be assumed that a
check-off authorization's validity is subject to an attack as an adhe-
sion contract just as are other private contracts.
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IV. Voting Rights of Members and Non-Members
A. A Non-Member's Right to Participate in a
Decision Regarding Affiliation
Questions of affiliation have received close attention from the
PLRB. Because the Board views the act of affiliation as having no
effect on the identity of the union certified as collective bargaining
agent,1 3 mere affiliation does not call for the Board's intervention
through the conduct of a representation election. When a union af-
filiates, however, it may undergo a change of name and may wish to
petition the PLRB to amend its certification as bargaining represen-
tative to reflect the name change.' 32 The Board will grant the peti-
tion if it is satisfied that four requirements are met: (1) the newly
affiliated union is a continuation of the old union with the same of-
ficers and functional leaders; (2) steps were taken to insure that a
majority approves affiliation and there was no loss of identity of the
certified union; (3) the day-to-day relationship with the employer has
not changed; and (4) the affiliated union has made clear that all con-
tract commitments to the employer will be honored. 33 Of course,
the petition will not be granted if it presents a question of representa-
tion, 134 for that would call for an election under section 605 of
PERA.' 35  The Board derived these rules from decisions of the
NLRB.' 36 Employees who are not union members have no right to
participate in balloting on a question of affiliation, 137 and employers
130. A check-off authorization is merely a "simple contract," Washington Post Co., 66
Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 553, 562 (1976) (Gamser, Arb.).
131. Jersey Shore Area School Dist., 4 P.P.E.R. 145 (PLRB 1974). "It does not seem to us
that mere affiliation of one organization with another is enough to establish a change in iden-
tity.,"
132. Lincoln Intermediate Unit No. 12, 7 P.P.E.R. 137 (PLRB 1976). A PLRB regulation
requires that a petition for amendment of certification set out the following information: (1)
name of employer and name of certified union; (2) address of employer; (3) identification and
description of existing certification; (4) details of the desired amendment and the reason for
amendment; (5) names and addresses of any other person or union claiming to represent any
employees in the unit and description of any contract covering any unit employees; (6) name,
affiliation and address of petitioner; (7) description of the process used in carrying out affilia-
tion; (8) other relevant facts. 34 Pa. Code § 95.23(b) (1979).
133. Lincoln Intermediate Unit No. 12, 7 P.P.E.R. 137, 138 (PLRB 1976). See also, PLRB
v. Pittsburgh Educ. Office Personnel, 5 P.P.E.R. 68 (PLRB 1974); Cheltenham Twp., 5
P.P.E.R. 80 (PLRB 1974).
134. Lincoln Intermediate Unit No. 12, 7 P.P.E.R. 137 (PLRB 1976).
135. PA. STAT. ANN tit. 43, § 1101.605 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
136. The four standards are derived from Emery Industries, 148 N.L.R.B. 51, 56 L.R.R.M.
1449 (1964). The rule against allowing amendments where questions of representation are
present comes from Bunker Hill Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 334, 80 L.R.R.M. 1338 (1972).
137. School Dist. of Pittsburgh, 5 P.P.E.R. 68 (PLRB 1974).
have no right to be informed that affiliation is being considered. 38
B. Contract Ratpication
The PLRB views a contract ratification vote as an internal
union matter in which public employees who are not members have
no right to participate. The Board first stated this rule in Reading
School District, 39 in which it held that an employer violated section
1201(a)(1) and (2)-interference with employee rights and interfer-
ence with the administration of a labor organization-by advising
nonmembers to attend the union's ratification meeting and to insist
on a secret ballot ratification vote.14°
In two recent cases, Eastern Lancaster County School District'
4'
and AFSCME, Local 2952H,142 the Board directly held that a union
does not violate the law by refusing to permit nonmembers to vote
on ratification in accordance with its bylaws. Heavy reliance was
placed on section 902 of PERA, which provides,
If the provisions of the constitution or by-laws of an em-
ployee organization requires [sic] ratification of a collective bar-
gaining agreement by its membership, only those members who
belong to the bargaining unit involved shall be entitled to vote on
such ratification notwithstanding such provisions.'
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The PLRB construed section 902 not only to forbid union members
who do not belong to the bargaining unit from voting-its obvious
intent-but as recognizing the legitimacy of limiting voting rights to
"those members who belong to the bargaining unit" by implying the
exclusion of nonmembers who work in the bargaining unit.'"
In both cases the Board relied on the NLRB's decision in
Branch 6000, Letter Carriers.4 5 The NLRB's holding supports by
implication the PLRB rule, and indicates the limits of how far the
PLRB may go in permitting exclusion of nonunion members from
voting. 4 6 The balloting at issue in Letter Carriers was a referendum
to determine whether the employees would have fixed or rotating
days off. Both employer and union would be bound by the outcome.
The NLRB held that the union violated federal law by prohibiting
nonmembers from voting. The vote on a referendum, the Board
said, is unlike a vote on contract ratification or selection of union
negotiators, which are "internal union matters properly determina-
ble by union members alone" as part of the union's representation
138. Rose Tree Media School Dist., 5 P.P.E.R. 87 (PLRB 1974).
139. 7 P.P.E.R. 174 (PLRB 1976).
140. Id. at 176.
141. 9 P.P.E.R. 338 (PLRB 1978).
142. 10 P.P.E.R. 107 (PLRB 1979).
143. PA. STAT. ANN tit. 43, § 1101.902 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
144. Reading School Dist., 7 P.P.E.R. 174, 175 (PLRB 1976) (emphasis added).
145. 232 N.L.R.B. 263, 96 L.R.R.M. 1271 (1977).
146. Id. at 263 n.1 96 L.R.R.M. at 1271 n.I.
process. 147 A referendum takes the place of bargaining through a
union; it is a substitute for negotiation, not an internal union matter,
and therefore, all employees have a right to participate. 148 Thus, the
NLRB stated, "denying the right to participate to non-members is to
encourage non-member employees to join the Union," 149 a violation
of section 8(b)(1)(A). 15
0
Because the federal policies relied on by the NLRB to differenti-
ate between internal union matters relating to union representation
and direct dealings with employers are like Pennsylvania's policies
under PERA' 5 ' it can be assumed that the PLRB will continue to
follow the Branch 6000, Letter Carriers rule in other situations. Cer-
tainly the PLRB will see the selection of negotiators, mentioned by
the NLRB as an internal union matter,"5 in the same light. And
because the denial of statutory rights to employees has the effect of
coercing union membership, illegal under state law as well as fed-
eral, 53 one can anticipate the PLRB making the same unfair labor
practice finding as the NLRB on similar facts.
IV. Conclusion
Article IV of PERA has thus far been construed to create rights
like those created by section 7 of the NLRA. Reliance by the PLRB
and Pennsylvania courts on federal labor law precedent is, therefore,
proper and should continue. Nevertheless, differences exist between
federal and state law that cannot be overlooked, and one should not
assume that a federally recognized right has been granted to Penn-
sylvania public employees. There is no state counterpart to the Lan-
drum-Griffin Act, the source of many employee rights under federal
law, and significant differences exist between PERA and the LMRA.
Statutory regulation of union security and dues check-off authoriza-
tions is an example of subjects regulated differently under state and
federal law, and from which different employee rights are drawn.
The NLRB and federal courts construe section 7 of the NLRA
so as to broadly protect employees in the exercise of their statutory
rights by examining closely the possible result of any act possibly




150. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(I)(A) (1976).
151. The right to be free from coercion of union membership is a basic right guaranteed
by Article IV of PERA, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § I 101.401 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
152. See note 148 and accompanying text supra.
153. See notes 1-3 and accompanying text supra.
aim for the same goal so that Pennsylvania's public employees can
enjoy the free exercise of their rights.
JAMES L. COWDEN
